Ibn Khaldun and Philosophy--Causality in History

Ali Çaksu’s 2017 article “Ibn Khaldun and Philosophy: Causality in History,” published in the Journal of Historical Sociology, offers a compelling and nuanced examination of Ibn Khaldun’s engagement with philosophical traditions—particularly Aristotelian causality—and his innovative adaptation of these concepts within his philosophy of history. By focusing on the role of causation in Ibn Khaldun’s magnum opus, the Muqaddimah, Çaksu challenges reductive interpretations that label Ibn Khaldun a mere Aristotelian or a passive inheritor of Greek thought. Instead, the article presents him as an original and dynamic thinker who synthesized philosophical, theological, and empirical insights to construct a historically grounded science of civilization (‘ilm al-‘umrān).

Çaksu’s central thesis is that while Ibn Khaldun was deeply informed by the Aristotelian doctrine of the four causes (material, formal, efficient, and final), he significantly transformed this framework to suit the contingencies of historical analysis and his monotheistic worldview. The author contends that attempts to rigidly map Aristotle’s static, metaphysical categories onto Ibn Khaldun’s fluid, cyclical model of historical change are not only anachronistic but also distort the originality of his thought. This insight forms the backbone of Çaksu’s critique of prior scholarship, which he argues has too often imposed external philosophical templates—whether Aristotelian, Hegelian, or Ash‘arite—onto Ibn Khaldun’s work without sufficient attention to its internal logic and context.

The article is methodically structured. It begins with a biographical and intellectual portrait of Ibn Khaldun as a polymath with extensive training in logic and philosophy, underscoring that while he never styled himself a faylasūf (philosopher) in the tradition of al-Farabi or Ibn Sina, his philosophical literacy was undeniable. Çaksu then provides a concise but thorough overview of Aristotle’s theory of causality, including its teleological orientation and the tendency to reduce the four causes to a matter-form duality.

The core of the article lies in its comparative analysis. Çaksu meticulously dissects how Ibn Khaldun reconfigures each of the four Aristotelian causes within his historical sociology:

• Material and Formal Causes: Ibn Khaldun identifies civilization (‘umrān) and dynasty (dawla) as mutually constitutive matter and form, but the relationship is reciprocal and dynamic—not fixed. As Çaksu notes, this mutual dependency resists the clear-cut categorization Aristotle applied to inanimate objects.

• Efficient Cause: While many scholars equate ‘aṣabiyyah (group solidarity) with the efficient cause, Çaksu demonstrates its contextual and dialectical nature: ‘aṣabiyyah can be both generative and destructive, depending on historical phase. It is not a constant engine of history but a variable force that waxes and wanes, sometimes even becoming irrelevant in stable, sedentary societies.

• Final Cause: Perhaps most strikingly, Çaksu highlights how Ibn Khaldun’s notion of telos diverges from Aristotle’s. For Ibn Khaldun, the “end” of civilization is not perfection but corruption—a paradoxical culmination that seeds its own decline. This undermines any notion of linear or providential progress, emphasizing instead cyclical rhythms governed by social and economic laws.

Crucially, Çaksu situates these transformations within Ibn Khaldun’s theological commitments. Unlike Aristotle’s detached Prime Mover, Ibn Khaldun’s God is an active, sovereign Creator whose “wise planning” operates through secondary causes. This Ash‘arite-influenced view allows for both divine omnipotence and the regularity of historical laws, rejecting both pure determinism and arbitrary interventionism.

One of the article’s greatest strengths is its resistance to intellectual pigeonholing. Çaksu refuses to label Ibn Khaldun as “Aristotelian,” “Ash‘arite,” or “proto-sociologist,” arguing instead that his genius lies in synthesis. The author also excels in highlighting the empirical dimension of Ibn Khaldun’s method: his emphasis on observable social patterns, economic factors, and psychological motivations marks a departure from purely metaphysical speculation.

Moreover, Çaksu effectively uses textual evidence from the Muqaddimah to support his claims, often drawing attention to passages where Ibn Khaldun himself reflects on the limits of human knowledge in tracing causal chains. This epistemological humility, Çaksu suggests, further distinguishes Ibn Khaldun from both classical philosophers and later Enlightenment thinkers.

While the article is rigorous and well-argued, it occasionally assumes reader familiarity with both Aristotelian metaphysics and Islamic intellectual history. A brief glossary or more contextual explanation of terms like maṣlaḥah (public interest) or maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah might enhance accessibility. Additionally, while Çaksu critiques reductive mappings of causality, his own alternative diagrams (in Sections 12.1 and 12.2) could benefit from more explicit linkage to primary textual examples.

In sum, Çaksu’s article is a significant contribution to the scholarship on Ibn Khaldun and the philosophy of history. It successfully repositions him not as a passive transmitter of Greek thought but as an independent and innovative thinker who adapted philosophical tools to address the complexities of human society and historical change. By foregrounding the dynamic, context-sensitive, and theologically informed nature of Ibn Khaldun’s causal reasoning, Çaksu invites a richer, more accurate appreciation of his legacy—one that transcends categorical labels and honors the originality of his vision. This piece is essential reading for historians, philosophers, and social theorists interested in cross-cultural epistemologies and the foundations of historical thought.

Source: Çaksu A. Ibn Khaldun and Philosophy: Causality in History. J Hist Sociol.2017;30:27–42. https://doi.org/10.1111/johs.1214942 ÇAKSU.