The Sociologist

By Nathaniel Schmidt

Ibn Khaldun would not have understood the statement that he was the founder of sociology rather than of scientific history. He regarded himself as the discoverer of the science of history precisely because he conceived of history as the science dealing with all the social phenomena of man's life. He would have strenuously objected to any such separation. What he had so laboriously put together, let no man put asunder. What would have been the use of his persistent efforts to show that his new science had for its object all aspects of human society, not only the rise and fall of states, defeats and victories in war, the exploits of generals and armies, diplomacy and peace treaties, and the various forms of political government, but all the occupations of men, trades and commerce, arts and sciences, philosophy and religion, and all the factors producing this varied social life, if the vast additions he had made to the province of history were to be taken away and handed over to another science, leaving historians again to pursue their task in the accustomed manner? To him, history was sociology, and sociology was history. So far as he was aware, so far as his intents and purposes went, he had not founded two sciences, but one. Was he right? He had with propriety extended the scope of history, and any restriction of the field he indicated would at present be regarded as unjustifiable. The field may be divided. We may have a history of hunting, fishing, agriculture, industry, or commerce, of art, science, literature, philosophy, or religion, of civil and ecclesiastical institutions, as well as of politics, war, diplomacy, or statecraft. We may have a history of individuals or of groups, larger or smaller. History as a science may apply itself to everything that has a history. Historiography, as an art, is learning to take into account a variety of human interests, to present in just proportions the various aspects, to shift the emphasis in accordance with growing demands.

Both as a science and as an art, however, history must, for practical reasons, limit itself. It cannot know all of human society, and it cannot carry along all that is known. Whether it occupies itself with the whole or some narrower part of the field, it must select, and it is expedient that it should select according to some principle. Such a principle may properly be found in the march of events, the change in conditions, the onward movement, the sequence in time, and whatever is connected with it as cause and effect. This leaves room for another science, also dealing with human society, but not in the same way, or with the same special interest, a science that surveys the facts from a different point of view, and examines them in a different manner, devoting itself to the analysis and classification of social facts, the scientific description of society, and the explanation of society in terms applicable to other forms of existence. As it must, of necessity, take note of successive stages of development, it has been maintained that history is only a branch of sociology, and as it seeks a rational explanation of all social phenomena, that it includes also the philosophy of history. There is no merit in logomachy. In one sense, there is only one all-embracing science; in another, there are many sciences, and all of these are not only coordinate but to some extent overlap and interpenetrate. If sociology is a special science, it must have a special field, whatever its relations may be to other sciences. Its delimitation depends upon the further precision of the objects of history and sociology. It becomes wider, if Karl Lamprecht's1 view is accepted, that "Die Geschichtswissenschaft ist die Wissenschaft von den seelischen Veränderungen menschlicher Gemeinschaften." His emphasis on. psychological changes in human communities and the resultant succession of culture-periods is of utmost importance, and even from this point of view it is possible to do justice to the individual psyche as part of the. whole. But it leaves to sociology a somewhat larger sphere, and it may be questioned whether the movement of which history takes cognizance is solely due to psychical causes. On the other hand, the field of sociology is narrowed, if its object is defined as Ludwig Gumplowicz2 defines it: "So lassen sich die Bewegungen der Gruppen selbst als primäre Erscheinungen zum Gegenstande einer selbständigen Wissenschaft, der Soziologie, machen, die wir daher als die Lehre von den sozialen Gruppen, ihren gegenseitigen Verhalten und ihren dadurch bedingten Schicksalen aufzufassen haben." Great as has been the influence of the mutual relations between social groups, and valuable as an intense study of this pervasive influence is, it can scarcely be maintained that sociology should restrict itself to this single phase of human society.. These observations may give rise to a branch science, as the investigations of Quételet3 Ied to that of statistics.

Though the term sociology seems to have been first used by Auguste Comte,4 it does not follow either that his definition of it should be regarded as final or that the scientific activity he so designates originated with him. Gumplowicz rightly maintains that the discipline existed long before the time of Comte, . and that Ibn Khaldun, m particular, went beyond the founder of positivism in the direction of his own thought, anticipating certain conclusions that seem to him of fundamental significance. Gumplowicz cites a number of striking instances. Ibn Khaldun speaks of different kinds of people—savages, nomads, organized tribes, those that occupy themselves with agriculture or with cattle-breeding, and those that live in cities; and explains the differences in their customs and institutions by their physical environment—habitat, climate, soil, food, and the different ways in which they are forced to satisfy their needs and obtain a living. He has obviously hit upon the same trail later followed by Bodin, Montesquieu, and so many others down to Buckle,

Spencer and Ratzel. Whether he had in mind a distinction as sharp as that suggested by the word Menschenarten, which Gumplowicz uses and finds significant because it must consistently lead to a polygenetic conception of the origin of the human race, may be doubted; but he undoubtedly thought of these groups as existing side by side since very early times. Among the factors that produce different groups and communities, he naturally mentions consanguinity, but also recognizes the social tie which tends to grow stronger than that of blood, especially in urban life, and sees an indication of this in the fact that peoples cease to designate themselves by their tribes and become known as dwellers within a certain territory. He compares the phenomena of human society with those of animal life, and savages and civilized men with wild and domesticated animals, and regards all beings, men included, as subject to the same Iaws of growth and decay which he applies to the rise and fall of noble families, ruling dynasties, political organizations, and even arts and sciences. Particularly important seem to Gumplowicz his observations on the reaction of social groups on one another and these groups themselves as the products of their social environment; the means he indicates by which solidarity is secured through the support of the ruler by a-strong party and the psychological effect of power upon the masses; his definition of the political state as "a human community, established through the force of circumstances and arising with natural necessity as a consequence of ambition to rule and love of power"; of military conquests by which states are founded as due to a "body of followers inspired by the same spirit and seeking the same end, a harmony that can only be the fruit of religion," and of legislation and constitutional monarchy as concessions to ward off revolution.

Colosio is also impressed with Ibn Khaldun's critical attitude toward the political state and his discussion of the social classes. But he also calls special attention to his searching inquiries as regards the origin, character, and use of wealth. With keen insight, Ibn Khaldun distinguishes between the wealth that consists in natural resources and that which accrues as the result of the efforts of men, traces the origin of property, private and public, and the division of goods, considers. commodities from the point of view of their quantity, and describes the social role of labor and the basis of wages. Expressions like "labor creates wealth"' remind of Karl Marx; sayings like "to work in the service of a master is a means of obtaining a living that is not in conformity with nature"' recall Dio Chrysostomus and the abolitionists. Much attention is given to imitation, in which Gabriel Tarde finds the elementary and distinctive social fact, and likewise .to the social aspect of adaptation so strongly emphasized by the modern thinkers. Maunier stresses the explanation given by Ibn Khaldun of the origin of society by combined action of three different causes: the imperious necessity of social life, the character of sociability rendering it possible, and the conscious will of man to realize it, as well as the conditions of its development: the physical milieu, climate, Iocality, soil, race, and nourishment. As regards race he points out that Ibn Khaldun does not, as the anthropological school, make it the unique determinant. Hussain,5 who carefully. guards himself against any exaggeration to which the fresh discovery of Ibn Khaldun's genius may have led modern students familiar with the text only through an excellent but not in every respect adequate French translation, cannot but recognize that, long before Montesquieu, he clearly discovered and laid down the law of causality in its widest application to human society; that he observed the similarity of all historic processes ("the past and the present are as much alike as two drops of water"), and explained it by the tendency to imitation and adaptation; and that he regarded science, art, and religion as products of social action. "Il a aperçu que tout un aspect de la vie humaine, confondu jusque-là par tous les philosophes grecs et arabes, dans des études morales et politiques, mérite d'être consideré et étudié à part, et il a essayé d'en connaitre le secret." He especially emphasizes as a remarkable fact the inclusion of the sciences, the arts and religion itself, within the circle of social phenomena. This had already been hinted at, so far as science is concerned, by Simon van den Bergh;6 and Hermann Frank,7 in discussing his investigations of Sufism, had brought out his explanation of religion as affected by the social development. His attitude on the questions of slavery and war rightly appears to Hussain superior to that of Aristotle. Just as he considers slavery something abnormal, 'not in conformity with nature,' so he regards war as something abnormal, on the ground that "God has not ordered some to command and others to obey." Thus he seizes upon what to his free and democratic spirit evidently appeared the most objectionable feature of warfare. He felt the antisocial nature of absolute authority and blind obedience and understood that, if some do not command as masters and others do not obey as slaves, there can be no organized war. It is needless to say that he was not an agitator for the abolition of either war or slavery. With his somber outlook upon life, he probably considered them inevitable and did not think that it was his business to justify as well as to explain the course of history, or to attempt to change what is crooked and cannot be made straight. Whatever inconsistency one may find in this, in view of his insistence upon public opinion and the will of man as factors in changing social conditions, it is sufficient to record that, in moments of rare insight, he registered his moral disapproval of institutions that seemed both necessary and beneficent to the ancient "master of those who think."

Spanish students of pedagogy point, with a pride which perhaps would have been gratifying to the Tunisian thinker, to the many fruitful suggestions he offers whose importance has come to be recognized in their science. Ribera declares concerning his Prolegomena: "Ia mas grande creación historica del islamismo puede con derecho reclamarli nuestra patria'; and Pons discusses his achievement in this and other fields. The publication of his Logic, if a manuscript is still in existence, would no doubt be of similar interest to Iogicians. Tremendous as have been the accomplishments in this vast field of sociology in recent times, it is amazing to what an extent already Ibn Khaldun's fundamental treatise meets the demand formulated by Franklin H. Giddings,8 for example, that sociological theories should start from psychological premise; but that the correlation of all processes with the character of the physical environment should be recognized throughout.

Chapter IV in Ibn Khaldun, Historian, Sociologist, and Philosopher (1930) Columbia University Press, New York, NY.

Notes

Die kulturhistorische Methode, 1900, p. 15. 

Soziolegische Essays, 1899, p. 16 

Sur la théorie de probabilités appliquees aux sciences morales et politiques, 1846. 

Système de politique positive, 1851-54. He uses both the terms 'sociologie' and 'physique sociale'. 

La Philosophie sociale d'Ibn Khaldoun, 1918. 

Umriss der Muhammedanischen Wissenschaften nach Ibn Haldun, 1912.

Beiträge zur Erkenniniss des Sufismus nach Ibn Khaldun, 1884.

Inductive Sociology, 1901.